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Since the end of the 1990s, natural 
resources have been the focus point of 
policymakers, academics, journalists, 
NGO activists and other observers 
trying to find a solution to the enduring 
armed conflict in Africa’s Great Lakes 
region. The illegal exploitation of 
mineral resources such as gold, 
diamonds, tin, tantalum and tungsten 
has been widely considered as one of 
the principle causes of the ongoing 
violence in the eastern part of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
State and non-state armed groups have 
been accused of using the revenues 
from the trade in 'conflict minerals' to 
enrich themselves and to finance their 
war efforts. In order to break the link 
between mining and conflict, promote 
transparency in the Congolese artisanal 
mining sector, and encourage increased 
due diligence efforts on the part of 
international companies buying 
Congolese minerals, a wide range of 
initiatives have been undertaken, both 
at the international and the Congolese 
national level. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This briefing describes how the EU regulation 
on conflict minerals has come into existence, 
and in what respects it distinguishes itself from 
similar, earlier legislation in the United States. It 
argues that the European conflict minerals law, 
which will come into force in 2021, is especially 
important from a symbolic point of view. The 
law signals a commitment at the European level 
to keep the conflict minerals issue on the policy 
agenda and to play an active role in promoting 
responsible business conduct in conflict-affected 
areas. From a practical point of view, however, 
it is doubtful whether the law will actually have a 
big impact on the existing situation as it only 
targets a relatively small group of European 
companies. Moreover, although efforts have 
been made to avoid some of the shortcomings 
of Dodd–Frank 1502 as well as to improve the 
general circumstances in and around the mines, 
there is still a lot more that can be done in this 
regard. The text is divided into three sections. 
The first section explains when and why 
European policymakers decided that it was time 
to come up with a continental counterpart to the 
American conflict minerals law; the second 
section describes how the debate among 
European legislators has been centred around 
the choice between a voluntary and a 
compulsory system. The third section contains 
some reflections on future developments. The 
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briefing mainly draws on desk-based research, 
supplemented with data collected through 
interviews with European Members of 
Parliament, NGO activists, business associations 
and industry representatives between 2014 and 
2017. 
 
CONFLICT MINERALS ON THE EUROPEAN 
AGENDA 
The EU is a big importer of sensitive material. 
In 2014, the EU was estimated to account for 
25% of the global trade in the 3Ts (tin, tantalum 
and tungsten), and 15 per cent of the global 
trade in gold. ii  These minerals are used in 
different branches of the EU economy, 
especially in the automotive, electronics, 
aerospace, packaging, construction, lighting, 
industrial machinery, and tooling industries, as 
well as in jewellery. iii  Surprisingly, however, 
despite the strategic importance of 3TG 
minerals (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) for 
the European economy, it has taken the EU a 
relatively long time to take genuinely active and 
concrete measures in the struggle against 
conflict minerals. Two factors have pushed 
European legislators to take a more active stance 
on the issue: first, the legislative discussion on 
conflict minerals in the United States, and, 
second, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.iv In July 
2010, President Obama signed into law the 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. Section 1502 of this law, which 
was originally intended to transform the US 
financial regulatory system after the global 
financial crisis, obliges stock-listed companies in 
the United States to annually report to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission on 
whether or not they are using conflict minerals 
in their products. Furthermore, the law also 
forces these companies to explain the measures 
they have taken to prevent their business 
activities from contributing to the financing of 
conflict in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. The 
introduction of conflict minerals legislation in 
the United States had a lot to do with the 
campaigning and lobbying efforts of the NGO 
community. Organisations like the US NGO the 
Enough Project, which was founded by the 
influential human rights activist John 
Prendergast and which enjoys the support of 
Hollywood celebrities like Matt Damon, Ben 
Affleck and George Clooney, and the British 
NGO Global Witness, which played a leading 
role in the fight against conflict diamonds at the 
end of the 1990s, managed to convince 
American legislators of the need to take 
responsibility in breaking the link between 
natural resource extraction and human rights 
abuses. 
 
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance has 
acquired the status of being the most important 
international standard for responsible business 
conduct in areas characterised by weak 
governance and conflict. This can be explained 
by the fact that the OECD has been working on 
the issue of responsible business conduct since 
the 1970s and is therefore seen as the most 
authoritative voice in the debate.  The Guidance, 
the first edition of which was published in 2011, 
aims to ‘help companies respect human rights 
and avoid contributing to conflict through their 
mineral sourcing practices’.  The document was 
developed through multi-stakeholder 
negotiations with representatives of OECD 
member states, the 11 countries of the 
International Conference on the Great Lakes 
region, industry, civil society, and the UN Panel 
of Experts on the DRC, among others. Its 
attractiveness lies in the fact that it offers 
companies a very practical five-step approach to 
identifying actual and potential risks in their 
supply chains. 
 
Between 27 March and 26 June 2013, the 
European Commission’s Directorate-General 
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for Trade launched a public consultation round 
with the aim of getting input from all 
stakeholders on potential EU conflict minerals 
legislation. In practice, most of the people taking 
part in the consultation belonged to either the 
business sector (73.2% of all respondents) or to 
the NGO community (11.1%). v  While the 
different groups of participants obviously 
disagreed on several points (and especially on 
whether or not the EU should opt for a 
compulsory or a voluntary system, see below), 
there appeared to be a widespread recognition 
of the need to avoid some of the shortcomings 
of the Dodd–Frank Act. While respondents 
from the private sector wanted the EU to give 
political and financial support to ongoing 
mineral traceability and certification and to steer 
clear of overly burdensome and costly reporting 
and auditing procedures, respondents from the 
NGO community highlighted the need to 
privilege a risk-mitigation approach over an 
outcome-based approach (where the only thing 
that matters is the 'conflict-free' status of the 
minerals), to pay attention to the possible impact 
of the new legislation on mining communities, 
and to invest in capacity-building at the local 
level in order to ensure a proper implementation 
of traceability mechanisms.vi 
 
THE CHOICE BETWEEN A VOLUNTARY AND A 
COMPULSORY SYSTEM 
Following up on the results from the public 
consultation round, Catherine Ashton, the EU 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, and Karel De Gucht, the EU 
Trade Commissioner, made a joint 
communication on 5 March 2014 on the launch 
of an integrated EU approach with regard to the 
responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict 
zones. Ashton and De Gucht introduced a draft 
regulation and a set of accompanying measures. 
The draft regulation essentially consisted of a 
system of self-certification for European 
importers of 3TG. The idea was to make the 
supply chain more transparent by publishing a 
list of EU and global 'responsible smelters and 
refiners' on an annual basis.vii 
 
The position of the European Commission was 
to address the issue through a voluntary 
approach. Instead of forcing EU companies to 
comply, like the US government had done with 
Dodd–Frank 1502, the Commission wanted to 
make it attractive for companies to behave 
responsibly by offering them different types of 
rewards, including incentives for bidders in 
public procurement projects of the EU and its 
Member States, financial support for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, and visible 
recognition for all participants in the 
programme. viii  The Commission proposed to 
focus on the most important importers of raw 
materials at the EU level and on the metal 
smelters and gold refineries, because the latter 
constitute 'choke points' in the supply chain: 
they are the last point at which the origin of the 
minerals can still effectively be traced. Under the 
voluntary system proposed by the Commission, 
companies would be invited to accept voluntary 
audits of their supply chains with a view to 
receiving certification that their activities did not 
fund any violence. Unlike the Dodd–Frank Act, 
which was only focused on cleaning up the 
mineral trade in Africa’s Great Lakes region, the 
geographical scope of the European system (an 
'opt-in self-certification system') would be much 
broader, seeking to promote due diligence 
across the globe in the 3TG mineral trade.ix 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, on 20 May 
2015, the European Parliament voted in favour 
of far-reaching amendments to the proposal of 
the Commission, demanding mandatory due 
diligence requirements for both importers of 
raw materials and products containing those 
minerals. In doing so, the Parliament overturned 
the Commission’s proposal and highlighted its 
commitment to the spirit of the OECD Due 
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Diligence Guidance, which is ‘intended to 
provide a common reference for all actors 
throughout the entire mineral supply chain’. x  
The strongest advocates of a mandatory system 
for all EU importers, and for a compulsory 
system of independent third-party audits of the 
due diligence practices of EU-based refiners and 
smelters (instead of the system of self-
certification as proposed by the Commission) 
were Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) belonging to left-wing groups in the 
European Parliament: the Socialists and 
Democrats Group, the Green/European Free 
Alliance Group and the European United 
Left/Nordic Green Left Group. Their main 
argument was that a voluntary system would be 
ineffective, because, in their view, most 
companies do not check their suppliers and fail 
to publish information on their due diligence 
practices, unless they are legally obliged to do so 
– a point that is also supported by research.xi For 
their part, MEPs at the conservative end of the 
political spectrum, such as most of those 
belonging to the European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group and to the European People’s 
Party Group, were dissatisfied with the results of 
the vote, because they feared that mandatory 
legislation covering the entire supply chain was 
'unrealistic' (potentially affecting 880,000 
European companies using 3TG in their 
products) and also because they thought it 
would probably have the same negative side 
effects as those observed in the case of Dodd–
Frank 1502.xii 
 
The unexpected result of the vote in the 
European Parliament left the Dutch presidency, 
which began on 1 January 2016, with the 
difficult task of finding a compromise on the 
EU mineral regulation. This was very 
challenging because the majority position in the 
European Council was in many respects close to 
that in the European Commission. Only a 
handful of Member States were prepared to go 
beyond a purely voluntary approach. Therefore, 
on 1 February 2016, a series of 'trilogues' were 
initiated: informal three-way talks between 
representatives of the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council behind closed 
doors.xiiiAfter four of these trilogues, the Dutch 
presidency was able to reach a political 
agreement about the framework for the EU 
mineral regulation. The main points of this 
agreement are the following:xiv 
✓ Importers of 3TG minerals and metals 
originating from conflict and high-risk 
areas need to apply due diligence, 
although there will be an exemption for 
importers of small volumes 
✓ Importers of 3TG in the form of semi-
processed or finished products are not 
subject to these due diligence 
requirements 
✓ The obligations in terms of due diligence 
will be based on the OECD due diligence 
guidance  
✓ Existing and future initiatives that meet 
the requirements of the EU regulation will 
be recognised  
✓ External experts will be tasked with the 
composition of an indicative list of 
conflict and high-risk areas that will be 
updated on a regular basis 
✓ The functioning and the effectiveness of 
the regulation will be evaluated by the 
Commission. The evaluation report will 
assess, among other things, to what extent 
downstream companies such as 
electronics companies and car producers 
have applied due diligence on a voluntary 
basis. If it turns out that the collective 
efforts of European companies fail to 
have a sufficient influence on the 
circumstances in conflict and high-risk 
areas, the Commission can decide to 
develop additional legislation 
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There will be a transition period giving 
companies and authorities the necessary time to 
implement the new regulations 
 
On 16 March 2017, the text of the EU mineral 
regulation was approved during the plenary 
session of the European Parliament. The strong 
discrepancy between the system demanded by 
the European Parliament and the eventual 
outcome of the trilogues under the Dutch 
presidency can be mainly attributed to the fact 
that the Council and the Commission – based 
on their positions – were not inclined to support 
a mandatory system that included all EU 
importers.xv 
 
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE 
The news about the approval of the EU mineral 
regulation has been overshadowed by rumours 
about an upcoming executive order from 
President Trump that will supposedly suspend 
Dodd–Frank 1502 for a period of two years. 
This suspension, which will reportedly be 
justified with the claim that Dodd–Frank 1502 
has led to a de facto embargo on Congolese 
minerals and to a climate of socioeconomic 
instability threatening US national security 
interests, has been received with great 
disappointment by campaigning organisations 
such as Global Witness, who have described it 
as 'a gift to warlords and corrupt businesses'.xvi 
Other observers are less pessimistic. According 
to Fabiana Di Lorenzo, who works for Estelle 
Levin, a consultancy firm specialising in the 
issue of due diligence in the global mining 
industry, the impact of Trump’s executive order 
will not be as big as many seem to think. First of 
all, in Di Lorenzo’s opinion, the repeal of 
Dodd–Frank 1502 will be partly compensated 
by other mandatory legislation and by soft laws 
that will likely ensure the continuation of 
responsible business practices in the mining 
industry. Second, NGOs and civil society 
activists can be expected to continue acting as 
watchdogs, naming and shaming corporate 
actors that fail to comply with internationally 
accepted norms and standards in the mining 
sector. Third, the EU mineral regulation has a 
much broader geographical scope than Dodd–
Frank 1502, since it not only applies to Africa’s 
Great Lakes region but to all conflict-affected 
areas across the globe. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the coming years will 
witness an expansion – rather than a reduction – 
of due diligence initiatives and practices on a 
worldwide level. Fourth and finally, since the 
introduction of Dodd–Frank 1502, there have 
been a growing number of multi-stakeholder 
partnerships between private companies, 
governments, supranational organisations, and 
NGOs to jointly promote the creation of 
transparent mineral supply chains. According to 
Di Lorenzo, these partnerships have not only 
yielded positive results in terms of banning 
‘dirty’ minerals from the global market, but also 
in terms of stimulating a stronger involvement 
and commitment of upstream actors in 
monitoring and managing supply chains. 
Consequently, Trump’s executive order will not 
automatically lead to a situation in which 
companies massively revert to their old ways of 
doing business with armed actors and their 
civilian representatives.xvii 
 
The question is, of course, to what extent this 
optimism is justified. While it is true that the 
number of soft and hard law instruments 
available for tackling the conflict minerals 
phenomenon has tremendously increased in the 
past decade, it cannot be denied that the repeal 
of Dodd–Frank 1502 will have the effect of 
lifting the legal pressure on tens of thousands of 
downstream companies in the United States to 
report on their due diligence efforts. Likewise, 
the EU mineral regulation in its current form 
seems to let the majority of the downstreamers 
off the hook. While EU-based smelters, refiners 
and direct importers of 3TG minerals and 
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metals are legally required to report on what 
they do in terms of due diligence, importers of 
small volumes of 3TG minerals and metals are 
only 'encouraged' to do so under the new 
regulation. For each of these minerals and 
metals an annual threshold will be fixed, and 
only companies whose imports exceed this 
threshold will need to report on how they 
identify and address the risks in their supply 
chains. This restriction of due diligence 
reporting requirements has been heavily 
criticised by international NGOs campaigning 
on the issue of conflict minerals, who argue that 
the new EU regulation lacks ambition. They are 
disappointed by the fact that nothing will 
prevent European downstream companies from 
making use of the services of smelters and 
refiners outside the EU, including those based in 
countries without a binding conflict minerals 
legislation. xviii  Critics have also expressed 
concern over the EU’s plan to work with a list 
of conflict-affected and high-risk areas compiled 
in consultation with external experts. Although 
this list is said to be indicative, non-exhaustive 
and subject to review on a regular basis, it is 
feared that it may once more create a situation in 
which certain mineral-rich conflict-affected 
countries become stigmatised (the DRC for 
example) and therefore avoided by international 
mineral buyers.xix 
 
Finally, a few words need to be said about the 
'accompanying measures', the set of political, 
diplomatic and development measures that are 
meant to ensure the effective implementation of 
the EU mineral regulation, and that are also of 
vital importance to avoid – or at least alleviate – 
possible negative socioeconomic effects of the 
new regulation. Disappointingly, from the outset 
of the negotiations about the European conflict 
minerals law, these accompanying measures 
have not been given the priority they deserve. 
This can be gathered from the fact that they 
were not part of the original draft legislation 
proposed by the Commission, but that they 
were only mentioned in the March 2014 Joint 
Communication of the European Commission 
and the European External Action Service, 
which was merely a policy document with no 
mandatory authority. Although, on March 2015, 
the EU High Representative, the EU 
Commissioner for Trade and the EU 
Commissioner for Development published a 
letter in which they announced the allocation of 
EUR 20 million for accompanying measures in 
the period between 2016 and 2020, there are still 
important gaps, as highlighted in a new report 
by EurAc (the European Network for Central 
Africa), a network of 40 civil society 
organisations working on issues related to 
Africa’s Great Lakes region. Most importantly, 
EurAc’s report points out a serious lack of 
financial support for measures that help to 
address persistent governance problems in 
Congo’s artisanal mining sector, such as poorly 
functioning public mining services, military 
involvement in mining activities, and mineral 
smuggling to neighbouring countries, among 
other things. xx  As long as the complexity and 
urgency of these governance problems 
continues to be underestimated by policymakers, 
there is little hope that the new EU mineral 
regulation will do much to change the existing 
situation on the ground. If the EU and its 
Member States are serious about responsible 
mineral sourcing and about improving the 
working and living conditions of people in the 
artisanal mining sector, they will have to come 
up with stronger accompanying measures than is 
currently the case.   
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